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Patterns of Democratization and State Controlled Pluralism: Is
Egypt Going Anywhere?
Ahmed Dardir
Ahmed Dardir majors in Political Science. He has participated in various activities including
Model United Nations (MUN) and Model Arab League (MAL). He is currently the director of a
council in the MAL that discusses change in Egypt.

Abstract: Free elections, reform of the constitution, reform initiatives, political
prisons, emergency law: the usual ingredients of the Egyptian political scene.
Does all this lead to a process of democratization? While the regime is widening,
can democracy work without mass participation? Is democracy a procedure or a
nationwide project? Can democratization work under emergency laws? Can
democratization work from above? This paper aims to provide an in-depth
exploration of these questions.

Introduction
On May 25th a nationwide referendum is taking place on a constitutional
amendment that allows many candidates to run for presidency, changing the old
system in which one person - Hosny Mubarak - is nominated by the parliament
and is presented to the nation through a referendum. Although this step would
appear to a distant viewer a large step on the road of pluralism and democracy
that should be applauded, this referendum is taking place amidst a call by many
opposition parties and groups for boycott. This amendment has failed to address
the desire of such groups for a real democracy in which the people can finally
have effective participation in the Egyptian politics. In order to achieve real
democracy, it is not enough to adopt democratic rhetoric or to install superficial
reforms that allow limited pluralism. Democracy is an end result of a building
process through which the people or the politicians build their polity, determine its
structure. By examining the meaning of democracy, its structure, the process of
building this structure and its underlying infra-structure, and contrasting this to
what is currently happening in Egypt, it would be clear that the so called
“reforms” the Egyptian government is carrying out are, in fact, not real
“democratization”.
What is Democracy?
Democracy is the rule of the people. This leads to the question of how the people
would rule themselves - directly, by representation, or by willingly submitting to a
ruler? The discourse thus evolving is about the structure through which it is
assumed that people would rule themselves.
In the classical Greek tradition, democracy is the form of government in which all
free adult male citizens would go to the people’s council to take political
decisions. However, with increasing population, this became impractical. The
idea then became that instead of allowing the people to take decisions, they can
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be allowed to choose the people who will take decisions. This form of
representative government is the essence of what became known as liberal
democracy.
Liberal Democracy
Liberal democracy can be defined as a form of “representative democracy”
where representatives are elected, and the constitution emphasizes the rights of
minorities and individual liberties - principles of private property, law and
individualism. It also depends on certain institutions that mediate and ensure
political participation and monitor the work of the government, ensuring that
people get their liberal rights.
The main type of institutions and organizations on which liberal democracy is
based are civil society institutions. Civil society is the structure that ensures that
the government is really based on people and on their participation. That is
because liberal democracy differs from the classical direct democracy in the fact
that there is a polity that is different from the people, while in theories of direct
democracies there is no such dichotomy - the citizens "are on the one hand
sovereign and on the other subject”1.
The Building of Liberal Democracy: A Historic and Theoretical Framework
Therefore, modern liberal democracy is based on certain concepts and
institutions that ensure that the polity is connected to the people, represents them
and protects their rights. Both the concepts and the institutions are products of
the western experience. On one side, liberal concepts could be traced back to
western philosophers like John Locke and John Stuart Mill. On the other side the
creation of the liberal institutions (whether on the level of the polity as in liberal
parliaments or the public level as in the civil society) cannot be isolated from the
western experience, in general, and western revolutions in particular. This does
not only highlight the specific cultural context of liberal democracy, but also
points out the fact that democracy is to be built through a long experience (as
argued in detail later).
The western liberal state structure has been the end product of a series of wars
that redrew both the state structure and the map for several times. The result of
this process was not only the development of nation-states, but also the need to
establish a legitimacy that at least would allow the ruler to tax his people to
finance their wars2.
Through the process of wars and revolutions, “rulers
realized that the promotion of development was vital to their survival”3. They had
to build a “bureaucratic state” that rests on the people as a source of structure
and legitimacy4. In this way the infrastructure for the western model of the state
was laid down. The liberal institutions were mainly a result of the western
revolutions. Revolutions and wars did not only redistribute power in the system
and create the liberal structure, but also were a determinant factor in achieving
legitimacy of the state. The fact that people shed their blood in the wars that
founded the state, and participated themselves in revolutions that established the
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state structure, made the state legitimate in their eyes5. Furthermore, these
revolutions united various classes under a common goal, and therefore, created
an organization with which most of the people (everybody except the old
aristocracy) identified and had an interest in, laying the foundations for the
modern state6. This modern state was the structure in which liberal democracy
was built, and the stratification of classes in these revolutions, entailing the
stratification of power among them, was a main factor behind the emergence of
liberal democracy7.
The Role of Mass Mobilization in Building Democracies
Mass mobilization therefore has been an important factor in building western
liberal democracies. It is natural that the building of the structure which will allow
the people to participate requires the participation of people, so that it becomes
really their structure: built in a way to ensure their participation and that suits
them and their culture. Having someone else building it for them would be futile.
First, because politics is a game of power, having someone else build the
structure means that this someone has the power. People might be then allowed
to participate through this framework, but it is not likely that the power will be
given to them. This can apply to the relatively liberal framework established by
former Egyptian President, Anwar El Sadat. Sadat allowed for political parties
and a parliament to exist. However, because the process was undertaken by him
and not by the people, he still had power over it. He never allowed the political
parties to have real power, and once they tried, he put an end to the process and
put all the opposition figures in prison.
This can explain the importance of mass movements in the building of
democracy. Mass mobilization mainly stresses the power of the people8. It
pressures the political elite, both ruling and opposition, to consider and take
forward the demands of the people9. If there is a “bargaining table”10 between the
government and the opposition leaders, the people push their own demands to
this table. This does not only create a structure for democracy but also saves
democracy from being monopolized by the elite, by providing a constant popular
pressure on this elite. It also acts as a power reservoir for the opposition elites
and gives them credibility (by proving that their demands are being supported).
Simply, it shows that the public can be mobilized against the government.
Sometimes this means that democracy is the “survival option” for the regime11.
Furthermore, in the presence of the people-polity dichotomy (as in liberal
democracies), mass mobilization is one factor that monitors the work of the
representatives, making sure they do represent the people, and pressuring them
to do so when necessary. Mass mobilization, or its potentiality, gives continuity
to the link between the people and their representatives, that otherwise would
only be present during elections. Finally, when mass mobilization is a part of the
state building process, it assures that this state has stemmed from the people
and therefore would make it more likely for the state to represent those people
and for the people to consider the state legitimate.
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What Happened in the Arab World
This pattern of state building by the hands of the people was not the case in the
Arab world. Instead of being built by the people, the states were built by the
colonial powers; they “came into being virtually overnight”12. The states were not
built by their people (as in the western model of wars and revolutions discussed
earlier) but “sovereignty was won by, or endowed on, former colonial units”13.
This does not only mean that they lacked legitimacy, but also that they were not
based on the people but on the outside. The mere structure of the state is
therefore not built on the people. That is why we see the rulers more concerned
with their image in front of the outside world rather than their image in front of
their people. That is why it is no wonder that the latest reforms are done
because of external pressure14. Internal pressure has no significance for
Mubarak. His state was built by the outside world and therefore his legitimacy is
based on the outside world15.
The problem with reforms made for an image is that they can be a façade and
still project a good image. This is the case with the suggested constitutional
amendment. By virtue of this amendment, parties are allowed to nominate
candidates. However the government is sure not to give a political movement
with real weight the license to become a political party. Giving licenses is the
sovereign responsibility of the High Council for Parties, which is a committee of
the Shura council, controlled by the ruling National Democratic Party. Also,
although it seems reasonable to require the signature of a certain number of the
members of the supposedly elected councils to allow someone to run for
presidential elections (as stated in the suggested amendment), elections for
these councils are being controlled by the government (as discussed later on).
After all, even without forgery of elections, the state still have the state of
emergency law activated, by virtue of which the ministry of interior can arrest
anybody without providing a reason. This means that they have the power to
arrest the presidential candidates and their supporters the night before the
elections. This illustrates how shallow reforms can project a democratic image,
while the lack of underlying infrastructure for democracy prevents the shallow
reforms from leading to real democratization.
The Democratic Infra-structure
Liberal democracy is based on a certain liberal infrastructure that guarantees
representation, social welfare, and popular participation. Therefore, to be able to
apply democracy, Egypt needs to develop an infra-structure on which it can build
a form of government that can represent and empower the people and, therefore,
which we can call democracy. The most important of the liberal infrastructures is
civil society.
Civil society is defined by London School of Economics and Political Science as:
the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests,
purposes and values often populated by organisations such as registered
charities, development non-governmental organisations, community
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groups, women's organisations, faith-based organisations, professional
associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, business
associations, coalitions and advocacy group.16
According to London School of Economics and Political Science “In theory, its
institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though
in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are
often complex, blurred and negotiated”17.
Based on this definition, civil society can include philanthropy organizations,
unions, cultural and communal activities, and even “organized religion”18.
Regardless of the definition, civil society is the structure that arises from the
people (on the grass roots level) and links between the people and the polity. It is
therefore a product of the society itself. The main feature of such organizations
would be that the people are comfortable with them and can participate easily
through them.
Therefore, liberal democracy needs civil society. Under the people-polity
dichotomy that is present in liberal democracies, civil society is one of the factors
that maintain popular participation in the polity, and maintain the link between the
state and the people, i.e. guarantees that liberal democracy remains a
democracy. Without civil society, there is a big danger that the polity gets
detached from the people and the representative function of the government gets
impaired.
Academics do stress the fact that Egypt, as well as the Arab world, is in need of
a civil society to act as a base for democracy19. However, what these academics
are missing is that civil society is what empowered and integrated western
people in a polity that became – due to this empowerment – a liberal democracy.
To achieve a form of democracy in Egypt, the polity needs to integrate not
western people but Egyptian ones. Exact emulation of the western civil society
might therefore not lead to integrating the people in the polity, as people will not
be likely to identify with structures created in the west. On the other side,
alternative organizations, assemblies and institutions that stem from the Egyptian
culture and society might be able to achieve the goals of civil society in the
Egyptian cultural pretext, and therefore would be more successful in giving birth
to a form of government in which people participate: a democracy.
Can we produce our own version? Traditional values and organizations, mainly
Islamic ones, have been successful in mobilizing people, and in forming a sphere
that entailed voluntary participation of the people and offered some sort of a
social welfare network, manifested in “private mosques health clinics, schools,
banks and investment companies”20. These institutions, however, are, unlike the
western civil society, outside the official political sphere21.
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Does this mean that these institutions are civil society? On one hand Carrie
Wickham, a researcher who conducted a field study about the political life in
Egypt, argues that they are not; “at least not in the liberal conception”22, mainly
because they are “independent sites of social and political expression within an
authoritarian setting;” while she believes civil society should not be “outside the
government” but “endowed with a legally mandated autonomy”23. One could add
another objection - that the religious nature of such institutions contradicts with
the secular nature of liberalism.
However, the point behind the effectiveness of such organizations and values is
that they are not western civil societies, but they are an alternative that stemmed
from the Egyptian society and culture. They are different, and their difference is
what comprises the difference between the western experience and the Egyptian
possible experience. For example, the fact that unlike western civil society, the
Egyptian alternative is outside the official political sphere, can be attributed to the
fact that unlike the western states, the Egyptian (and other Arab states) has
neither evolved from the society, nor gained legitimacy (and therefore the
unofficial sphere is as legitimate as, if not more legitimate than, the official
sphere); nor has it allowed in its official sphere a chance for mass participation
(the fact that the government refuses to legitimize such institutions, and that they
sometimes fight them, despite of the apolitical nature of some, reveals how the
government refuses to allow in its official sphere mass participation). This does
not mean that they are not civil society. After all “Civil society commonly
embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their
degree of formality, autonomy and power”24.
Furthermore, the difference between the Islamic nature of such organizations,
and the secular nature of their western counterpart, reveals the difference in
culture between the Egyptian society and the western societies. After all,
secularism is one of the end products of the western experience25. Nevertheless,
“faith based organizations” are included in the London School of Economics
definition26, and “organized religion” is given as an example for civil society27.
Therefore, traditionalist and Islamic institutions are an Islamic/Arab version of the
civil society. They are therefore apt to lead to an Egyptian kind of democracy just
the way civil society lead to and maintained western liberal democracy. As
Wickham herself noted “the vision of Medina, the paradigmatic Islamic state, can
be as powerful as liberal democracy in the envisioning of, and purposeful striving
towards, alternatives to present forms of military-bureaucratic rule.”28 Instead of
judging these institutions using the western standards, we should study whether
these institutions can empower and/or represent the people to form a basis of a
form of government that would not be necessarily similar to western liberal
democracy, yet similar in the fact that the people are empowered and/or
represented and are at the same time analogous with our culture and society. A
possible area for further research is how traditional and/or Islamic organizations
can form a social network that ensures participation and welfare. Present
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literature focuses more on Islamic institutions. However research should also
examine other traditional organizations, such as families and tribes (given the
“blurred boundaries” between civil society from one side and the family on the
other29) and examine the extent to which such organizations can offer a civil
society30. On the other side, academics can talk as much as they will about civil
society, but such a notion is meaningless until it means something to the people
to whom it is aimed to empower.
Liberal Democracy and the Arab World
Liberal democracy, the model for democracy that is now imposed by the western
discourse, is clearly built on an infrastructure that is related to the western
experience and western culture. Democracy is not a consumer product. While it
is constructive to view cultural/political products of the west with admiration and
try to achieve similar ones, directly importing them might be destructive. Imported
democracy, without the presence of a social and cultural infrastructure would
doom democracy to remain a shallow process which does not reach deeply in
the society. For example, liberal democracy without ensuring links between the
polity and the people (as in civil society and other mechanisms that would ensure
continuous contact between the people and their representatives like mass
mobilization) would further emphasize the people-polity dichotomy and would
weaken representation and turn it into a cover for yet another authoritarian form
of rule.
Arguably, this is what happened in the Arab world. The western, seemingly
liberal crust, was a cover for an authoritarian core. Bernard Lewis, the famous
orientalist academic, laments the fact that modernization did not work in the
Muslim world, pointing out the fact that the only relatively successful westernstyled modern regimes were the most oppressive ones31. However, the fact that
western modern regimes had to be dictatorships in order to succeed, points to a
very interesting fact: that such western-style modernization did not appeal to the
people, and therefore had to be imposed on them. As Lewis himself points out;
this modernization was imposed either by “departing imperialists” or “innovative
native reformers”32. In the first case, it is another country that imposed the
western model, and therefore it could not be considered democratic. In the
second case, Lewis uses the examples of Ataturk in Turkey, one of the most
ruthless dictators the region has ever witnessed33. Because of the fact that the
western paradigm of modernization and democracy is built on a western
infrastructure meant that applying this paradigm of modernization needed the
imposition of the western social infrastructure. This contradicts with the idea of
the people ruling themselves and cannot be called a democracy. This may
explain the phenomenon Lewis laments, that the application of modernization in
the Arab/Muslim world lead to dictatorship.
On the other side, Tim Niblock, a British scholar states that “there is no reason to
believe that it [modernization theory] explains the slow pace of democratization in
the Middle East”34. In fact it does, but in a manner reverse to that in which Lewis
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uses it. The fact that Arabs lack the “socio-economic prerequisites for liberal
democracy”35 should mean that they should look for a basis for “socio-economic
prerequisites” in their society and culture and build on them their democracy,
which will not be necessarily the western form of liberal democracy.
Without building an authentic infrastructure, the democratic procedures would
help some voices within the society to be heard, but it will not ensure that the
voice of the people in general would be heard, and would not assure the people
that their voice will have a real decision making power. It is not enough to have
the pluralistic procedure to have democracy. The building process in itself is also
necessary.
Process or Procedure
Is democracy just a procedure of free elections and representation? Or is it a
wider process in which a civil and cultural infra-structure is being built to let the
voice of the people be heard and obeyed? Is a decision from above to allow freer
elections or to give more freedom to the press enough to assure that the people
do rule? While some claim that democratization does not need an “infrastructure” and that “democracy is not about substance but about procedure”
arguing that democracy is just a “choice taken by the political elite”36 others
argue that democracy is being used “as a slogan”, and that we are ignoring what
is underneath it37. To them democratization is a “process” which is “long and
costly”38. To such minded people, democracy should be rooted in the society and
its “political culture”39.
From the previous discussion, it appears that democracy is an end result of the
nation-building process that gives rise to a social infrastructure. Without this
social infrastructure, people will not get empowered to participate and be
effective. The process without the procedure might give rise to pluralism, but not
democracy.

Democracy and Pluralism
Pluralism could be defined as “a framework of interaction in which groups show
sufficient respect and tolerance of each other, that they fruitfully coexist and
interact without conflict or assimilation”40. Therefore, pluralism could be
considered a framework through which different factors of the society co-exist
and make their voices heard. This is not sufficient for democracy, as democracy
requires that the people are empowered enough so that their will is interpreted as
state decisions. Pluralism is just a procedure to allow civil factors (parties, civil
society, or simply people) to participate. This means that those civil factors
should be powerful enough to make a difference. Pluralism is only one of the
many factors that are required to mediate participation, which in turn is an
important factor in structuring democracy41.
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Pluralism is apt to lead to democracy, only if there is enough infrastructure to
make the people participate through this framework, and if this participation can
gain power (for example by not having a higher authority blocking the decisions
taken through the pluralistic framwork). The two conditions are interlinked,
because when there is a structure to empower the people, then it is likely that
their voice gains power. This power is a result of the momentum people gain
through public action and through being ready to go forward with political action
to assert their power. Pluralism therefore could be considered a prerequisite for
democracy, but it is not the same as democracy.
Democracy is therefore not only about pluralistic procedures but is also a “highly
contingent process that is fraught with considerable uncertainty”42. When the
meaning of democratization is restricted to pluralism, the power of democracy
can still be within the hands of the elites. In such a case, only the already
powerful elite would participate and have an effect on state decisions.
Furthermore, this means that the state still has power over the people and over
the pluralistic procedure and can at once stop it, as when Sadat stopped the
pluralistic experience once it was used to voice criticism against him.
In fact, pluralism in the Arab world has been a “tactical” decision taken by
governments as a “response to crises”43 (crises such as the current US pressure
coupled with the popular unrest). On this, one could base the argument that the
suggested amendment for the constitution is nothing but a superficial and
shallow procedure that fails to address the keys for democracy. Under the lack of
an authentic infrastructure, reforms have failed in achieving the government of
the people. The suggested amendment has only led to a shallow procedure of
pluralism in which people can vote, have parliaments and in which some voices
can be heard, without real popular rule.
Egypt’s Controlled Pluralism
The state structure in Egypt is a clear example of a case of pluralism that is
controlled from above and, therefore, does not lead to the transfer of the power
to the people. This structure started at the hands of Sadat, when he allowed for
political parties. Before that, Egypt was a one party system in which the
parliament was controlled by the ruling party, yet some independents managed
to make it to the parliament. Although Sadat opened the door for the founding
political parties, his laws stated that a party would not get license unless it
already has a certain number of members in the parliament, i.e. parties had to
have members in the parliament before coming into being. Furthermore, Sadat
centered the system around himself in a manner that gave him a lot of powers
(like the power to nominate himself for as many times as he willed, together with
his power over the security apparatus, by which he arrested all political activists
shortly before his death). Mubarak maintained the system he inherited from
Sadat, and kept a similar control over the security apparatus through the
emergency law.
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The Egyptian state has developed many mechanisms to maintain control over
the political process even with the presence of a pluralistic procedure44. The most
significant of these mechanisms is the state of emergency law, by virtue of which
the government can arrest anybody, prevent assemblies, and the president can
issue decrees bearing the power of law. Simply, the emergency law limits the
power of the people to act (by preventing them from assembly and by threatening
them of being arrested once they take political action) and increases the power of
the president and his security apparatus. Another mechanism is the strong
control the state exerts over the bureaucracy. To any close observer of the
Egyptian government, power and decision making have a very clear line that
originates from the president45. A third mechanism is limiting the power of the
representative bodies and mechanisms. This is clear in the privileges the
president used to enjoy, including the right to re-elect himself for as much as he
wanted, and his power to dissolve the parliament. Even pluralism has been
limited in Egypt. However, right now it seems that as a result of external pressure
the last mechanism is being taken away from the government, which means that
the government would be apt to rely more heavily on the first two.
This strong control that the Egyptian government maintains over the political
process, means that it is able to control, for example, elections. Through the
strong state security that is controlled by the president and his regime, and that
has wide powers under the security law, it becomes easy for the state to fence
election booths and prevent unwanted voters from entering46.
As long as such control is maintained, amending the constitution and increasing
the pluralistic space is void. Until now, even if free presidential and parliamentary
elections take place (which is not even the case as the candidates are still
controlled), and even if there is no falsification of the elections, still the state
would have the power to arrest voters and candidates, prevent candidates from
presenting their programs (through the ban on assemblies under the emergency
law) and prevent people from voicing their opinions and carrying out their will.
Conclusion
Consequently, no real democratization taking place in Egypt. There has been no
attempt to build an authentic infrastructure and mobilize the people or link to
them. Never has there been a genuine attempt to transfer political power to the
people. Reforms have been initiated not to empower the people but to project a
good image to the west, as a response to western pressure for reforms - just as
the paradigmatic discourse is designed to suit the west and not the Egyptian
society. With the lack of an infra-structure for integrating and empowering the
people, pluralism became a shallow procedure that does not reach the people
nor echo their voices. In order to really democratize, the Egyptian state has to be
ready to let go of its unchecked powers. However, until now the Egyptian state is
not ready to do that. The only hope for democratization is that the Egyptian
people develop their own infrastructure for their own type of democracy, and then
be able to recover their overdue power.
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